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Abstract:  
The importance of taking into account multiple dimensions of wellbeing in the 
measurement of poverty has been emphasized in the recent literature. The poverty 
alleviation literature has not, however, yet addressed the important issue of policy  
design for efficient multidimensional poverty reduction. From a normative perspective,  it 
can be argued that, in addition to being concerned with impacts on multiple dimensions 
of poverty, policy should also consider impacts on their joint distribution. From a positive 
perspective, it is regularly observed that different poverty dimensions are often 
correlated and mutually reinforced, especially over time. The paper integrates these two 
perspectives into a consistent policy evaluation framework. Targeting dominance 
techniques are also proposed to assess the normative robustness of targeting 
strategies. The analytical results are applied to data from Vietnam and South Africa and 
illustrate the role of both normative and positive perspectives in designing efficient 
multidimensional poverty targeting policies. 
 
Keywords: Targeting, Multidimensional poverty, Efficient policy, Vietnam, South Africa 
 
JEL Classification: D63, H21, I38 
 
1 Introduction
It is increasingly argued that, to measure multidimensional poverty, it is important to
take into account both the levels of welfare in the various dimensions of interest and the in-
teractions across those dimensions. This matters both for identifying the multidimensional
poor and for measuring the magnitude of their poverty (see for instance Alkire and Foster
2011 and Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003). The interactions across the dimensions
take various forms and may be sustained both in the short and in the longer term. In many
situations, the welfare dimensions are positively correlated (i.e., a deterioration in income
worsens nutrition, and worse nutrition diminishes household productivity); negative corre-
lations can, however, also occur (as when an increase in child school attendance decreases
household income, at least in the short term). The interactions between welfare dimensions
can be especially strong in cases of severe deprivation over a long period, as in the case of
“continuing multi-dimensional poverty traps” (see for instance Thorbecke 2005).
Although the policy importance of taking into account multidimensional linkages has
also been recognized, means and objectives have sometimes been confused. For instance,
although reducing unidimensional monetary poverty is often the salient policy objective, it
is regularly achieved through the use of multiple means and proxies. A prominent example
is the use, in many Latin American countries, of multidimensional eligibility proxies to
allocate conditional cash transfers (CCT) to low-income families, with the usual aim of re-
ducing income poverty. Multidimensional conditionality rules are also sometimes imposed
to leverage the cross-dimension effects of these cash transfers on education, nutrition and
health for instance. The social objective of such rules and transfers, however, is rarely
explicitly set in terms of multidimensional poverty reduction.1
More broadly, to assert clearly whether policy is deemed to reduce multidimensional or
unidimensional poverty would seem particularly important.2 As pointed out by Azevedo
and Robles (2010), erroneously focussing policy on unidimensional poverty measurement
may lead to a sub-efficient fall in multidimensional poverty. (This is in fact the core mo-
tivation of this paper.) Using multidimensional poverty indices to design policies whose
objective is to reduce unidimensional poverty can also be non-efficient. This is a point
1One exception is the Chile Solidario program, which has the explicit objective of reducing multidimen-
sional poverty (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).
2This issue is central in an ongoing United Nations debate on whether the next round of Global Devel-
opment Goals (initially termed Millennium Development Goals in 2000, set in 2015 to become Sustainable
Development Goals, see http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/) should feature a multidimensional poverty
index to stand alongside an income poverty measure.
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made by Ravallion (2011), who argues that, to reduce income poverty, it is better to target
the income poor, and that to reduce deprivation in access to public services, it is anal-
ogously better to target independently those that are deprived of such services. Using a
multidimensional index of poverty (MIP) that mixes up the two dimensions can lead to a
sub-efficient reduction of unidimensional income and public services poverty:
“The total impact on (multidimensional) poverty would be lower if one based
the allocation on the MIP [multidimensional index of poverty] rather than the
separate poverty measures — one for incomes and one for access to services.
It is not the aggregate index that we need for this purpose but its components.”
(Ravallion 2011, p. 240, our emphasis)
Unlike Ravallion (2011), this paper assumes that the policy objective is to reduce multi-
dimensional poverty and not to reduce poverty in a particular dimension (as is meant by the
italicized term in the above citation). We are not aware of previous work that derives policy
rules in order to reduce poverty efficiently in a formal multidimensional setting. The paper
then sets the social objective function in terms of multidimensional poverty reduction and
then works towards that normative objective by taking into account the empirical effets
of policy on the joint distribution of dimensions of well-being. In doing this, the paper
considers three particular manners through which targeting may affect multidimensional
poverty: through a direct effect on the targeted dimension, through an indirect effect on
joint deprivation, and through a spill-over effect on the other dimensions. The paper thus
considers interdependencies of policy effects across multiple deprivations, as advocated in
the 2009 Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and
Social Progress (see Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009):
“[T]he consequences for quality of life of having multiple disadvantages far
exceed the sum of their individual effects. Developing measures of these cu-
mulative effects requires information on the ‘joint distribution’ of the most
salient features of quality of life across everyone in a country through ded-
icated surveys. (...) When designing policies in specific fields, impacts on
indicators pertaining to different quality-of-life dimensions should be consid-
ered jointly, to address the interactions between dimensions and the needs of
people who are disadvantaged in several domains.” (pp. 15-16)
This being said, how to capture these ‘interactions between dimensions’ and measure
the importance of ‘disadvantages in several domains’ is an important source of ambiguity
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and/or arbitrariness in the multidimensional poverty literature. Several multidimensional
poverty indices have indeed been proposed, and none of them has emerged as necessarily
better than all of the others. To address this difficulty, the paper focuses on ‘intersection
poverty indices’ since these indices can be used to check the ‘dominance’ of targeting
policies. Apart from motivating a focus on such intersection indices, the multidimensional
targeting dominance techniques that are introduced in the paper can indeed also show the
normative strength of any proposed targeting prescription.
It has also been well known for some time that an appropriate targeting indicator to
reduce a poverty index is not necessarily the poverty index itself — see for instance Kanbur
(1987) and Besley and Kanbur (1988) in the context of unidimensional poverty reduction.
Referring to their MIP, Alkire and Santos (2010) suggest that it “could be used to target the
poorest, track the Millennium Development Goals, and design policies that directly address
the interlocking deprivations poor people experience.” (p. 1). Although the intention is
clear (to reduce a MIP), it is unclear how the MIP itself can be of direct policy use. Rather,
it would seem that explicit policy rules need to be derived to reduce efficiently a MIP. As
shown in the paper, these rules are not in general straightforward transformations of that
MIP.
The paper then proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 presents the multidimensional poverty
indices used in the paper. For expositional simplicity, the paper focuses on bidimensional
poverty, although the insights and results can be extended to more than two dimensions.
Section 2.1 also explains how one can assess where poverty is “robustly” (in a normative
sense) greater using these multidimensional indices. This is done by building dominance
surfaces based on “intersection” indices, thus justifying this paper’s subsequent focus on
such indices. These links between multidimensional intersection indices and poverty dom-
inance are used later on to provide targeting policies that are efficient over a wide set of
procedures for measuring multidimensional poverty.
Section 2.2 discusses the (theoretical) impact on multidimensional poverty of target-
ing one dimension, for stylized additive and multiplicative transfers. Section 2.3 derives
conditions for determining which population subgroup should be targeted first such as to
reduce poverty fastest. Section 2.4 enriches these results by allowing for inter-dimensional
spill-over effects. Section 2.5 defines multidimensional targeting dominance surfaces and
assesses whether priority rankings for group targeting and other types of targeting schemes
are normatively robust over classes of multidimensional poverty indices.
The application of these analytical results is then illustrated in Section 3 with data from
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Vietnam (1992-1993) and South Africa (1993). Interesting insights emerge. For instance,
it is shown that combining direct effects, joint deprivation effects, and spill-over effects
can change significantly our understanding of the poverty impact of targeting. It is also
observed that efficient rules for the geographical decentralization of targeting funds may
differ according to whether it is unidimensional or multidimensional poverty that national
authorities wish to reduce. The efficiency of socio-economic allocation rules is also deter-
mined by the type of multidimensional poverty indices and the range of poverty frontiers
that are the objects of policy as well as by the type of transfers that are envisaged. Section
4 provides a brief conclusion.
2 Framework
2.1 Measurement and robustness
It is one thing to concur that poverty is multidimensional; it is another to agree on a
specific procedure to measure it. The literature has been building up a stock of various
multidimensional indices over the recent years; see among several others Chakravarty,
Mukherjee, and Ranade (1998), Tsui (2002), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), and
Alkire and Foster (2011). All such indices have the potential to order the extent of poverty
differently across distributions. This also means that they may provide different policy
guidelines, especially regarding the design of targeting schemes.
One way to circumvent this problem is to seek unanimity of policy guidance across
classes of poverty measurement procedures. To do this, we follow the measurement frame-
work of Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006) (DSY, for short), which we now briefly sum-
marize. DSY starts by defining well-being (measured, for expositional simplicity, over
two dimensions of well-being, x and y) as a function φ(x, y) that increases in both x and
y. An unknown poverty frontier φ(x, y) = 0 that separates the poor from the rich is sup-
posed to exist, a frontier over which individual well-being is equal to a “poverty level” of
well-being, and below which individuals are in poverty. The set of the poor is then given
by Λ(φ) = {(x, y) |(φ(x, y) ≤ 0}. Multidimensional additive poverty indices can then be
represented by
P (φ) =
∫ ∫
Λ(φ)
π(x, y;φ) dF (x, y), (1)
where π(x, y;φ) is the contribution to poverty of an individual with well-being indicators
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x and y and where F (x, y) is the joint distribution of x and y.
Let πx, πy and πxy be first-order and cross-derivatives of π with respect to x and y,
respectively. DSY then defines a first-order class Π1,1(φ∗) of bidimensional poverty indices
as:
Π1,1(φ∗) =


P (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Λ(φ) ⊂ Λ(φ∗)
π(x, y;φ) = 0, whenever φ(x, y) = 0
πx ≤ 0 and πy ≤ 0 ∀x, y
πxy ≥ 0, ∀x, y.


(2)
The indices that belong to Π1,1(φ∗) must consider as potentially poor only those individuals
that belong to the largest reasonable poverty set, defined by Λ(φ∗). The indices must also
be continuous along the poverty frontier, be weakly decreasing in x and in y, and be such
that the marginal poverty benefit of an increase in either x or y decreases with the value
of the other variable. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) refer to this latter property as a
property of non-decreasing poverty under a “correlation-increasing switch”; this implies
that, ceteris paribus, the greater the incidence of multiple deprivation, the higher the level
of multidimensional poverty.
Higher-order classes of poverty indices are obtained by imposing further assumptions
on the derivatives of π(x, y;φ). For instance, the class Π2,2(φ∗) of second-order indices are
convex in x and in y; furthermore, that degree of convexity decreases with the level of the
other indicator and at a decreasing rate. Further details can be found in DSY.
To test for whether the poverty ranking of two distributions is robust across all members
of a given class of poverty indices, DSY introduces the following bidimensional poverty
indices:
P (αx, αy) =
zx∫
0
zy∫
0
(
zx − x
zx
)αx (zy − y
zy
)αy
dF (x, y), (3)
where αx ≥ 0, αy ≥ 0, zx and zy are poverty lines in dimensions x and y respectively, and
where
(
zx−x
zx
)
and
(
zy−y
zy
)
are called normalized “poverty gaps” in the poverty literature,
respectively, in x and in y.3 Tracing (3) over sets of values of zx and zy draws a “dominance
surface”.
DSY then shows that if PA(αx, αy) for some distribution A is greater than PB(αx, αy)
3For expositional simplicity, we use P (αx, αy) although making (zx, zy) explicit in P (αx, αy; zx, zy)
would be more precise.
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for some distribution B over all choices of (zx, zy) within Λ(φ∗), then poverty will be
unambiguously higher in A than in B for all of the poverty indices that are members of the
class Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗) of multidimensional poverty indices of order (αx+1, αy+1) and for
all poverty frontiers that lie within Λ(φ) ⊂ Λ(φ∗). Let ∆P = PA − PB; this leads to:
Proposition 1
(Multidimensional poverty dominance)
∆P (φ) > 0, ∀P (φ) ∈ Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗), (4)
iff ∆P (αx, αy) > 0, ∀(x, y) ∈ Λ(φ∗). (5)
Note that these classes of indices include intersection, union, and intermediate poverty
indices, as long as these fit within Λ(φ∗), although the index in (3) is an intersection index.
The converse is also true: only if PA(αx, αy) is larger than PB(αx, αy) over all values of
(zx, zy) within Λ(φ∗) can we be certain that poverty is unambiguously larger in A over all
members of the class Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗) of multidimensional poverty indices of order (αx +
1, αy + 1).
It cannot be argued convincingly that the intersection index in (3) is necessarily better
than all other possible multidimensional poverty indices. The superiority of one index over
another is generally a matter of value judgment. There are, however, important advantages
in focusing on (3), which is what this paper does. First, (3) is a natural generalization of
the popular unidimensional FGT indices — see Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) —
defined as
P (αx) =
zx∫
0
(
zx − x
zx
)αx
dF (x) (6)
for poverty in x. Second, and through its intersection nature, (3) also focuses on the poorest
of the poor, that is, on those that are more likely to suffer from multiple deprivation. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, if some policy consistently lowers (3) for a wide range of
intersection poverty frontiers, then, by Proposition 1 above, that policy will also reduce
poverty for a large class of other poverty indices, possibly with different poverty frontiers.
Such a result is unfortunately not available when using other sorts of multidimensional
poverty indices.
Much of the paper then rests on how (3) changes when dimensional indicators vary
through policies and shocks. We will more particularly consider those cases in which
P (φ) is affected by additive and multiplicative transfers (denoted respectively by γ and λ),
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sometimes targeted to groups A or B. We will thus denote as P (φ, γ) the value of P (φ)
following an additive transfer and as P (φ, γA) the value of P (φ)when this additive transfer
is targeted to group A.
To assess the impact of such transfers, it is useful to extend (3) to cases in which αx or
αy may equal minus one. Let then
P (αx = −1, αy) = f (zx)
zy∫
0
(
zy − y
zy
)αy
f (y|x = zx) dy, (7)
where f (zx) is the density of x and f (y|x) is the density of y conditional on x. P (αx =
−1, αy) is thus the y-dimension FGT poverty of those individuals whose x value borders
the x-dimension poverty line, times the density of those individuals in the population.
Similarly,
P (αx, αy = −1) = f (zy)
zx∫
0
(
zx − x
zx
)αx
f (x| y = zy) dx. (8)
It is also useful to rewrite P (αx, αy) in a way that shows explicitly the role of the corre-
lation of attributes in the valuation of multidimensional poverty. Letting f+ = max(f, 0),
we can rewrite (3) as:
P (αx, αy) = P (αx)P (αy) + cov
[(
zx − x
zx
)αx
+
,
(
zy − y
zy
)αy
+
]
. (9)
Thus, bidimensional poverty P (αx, αy) equals the product of the two unidimensional po-
verty indices plus the covariance between the poverty gaps in the two attributes. This latter
term captures the importance of the “association” between the two dimensions.
DSY illustrates how this association term can play a crucial role in multidimensional
poverty dominance. It can happen, for instance, that urban areas unidimensionally dom-
inate rural areas both in income and in health, but not bidimensionally, because urban
areas display greater levels of multiple deprivation. It can also happen that, although uni-
dimensional comparisons may be ambiguous, multidimensional comparisons are not, the
ambiguity being resolved by the joint distribution information.
More generally, inspection of (9) shows why a focus on unidimensional poverty (P (αx),
say) may lead to a different policy guidance from that provided by a focus on multidi-
mensional poverty. Not only does P (αy) multiply P (αx), but the covariance of multiple
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deprivation also distinguishes P (αx) from P (αx, αy). The policy consequences of this dif-
ference are now considered in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In Section 2.4, an additional distinction
is introduced by considering cases in which transfers in the x dimension have “spill-over”
effects on the y dimension.
2.2 The effect of one-dimension targeting
We now consider how changes in either dimension can affect multidimensional poverty.
These changes can come from different sources, such as growth and macroeconomic shocks.
We focus on the impact of targeting policies, although the results are extendable to other
sources of distributional changes.
2.2.1 Additive transfers
Assume that an additive transfer γ is granted to everyone in a population. This is a
simplifying framework; it will be enriched later on. We can then re-write (3) as
P (αx, αy, γ) =
∫ ∫ (
zx − x− γ
zx
)αx
+
(
zy − y
zy
)αy
+
dF (x, y) (10)
and also express P (−1, αy, γ) and P (αx,−1, γ) in (7) and (8) analogously. For αx > 0, a
marginal change in γ will change bidimensional poverty by
∂P (αx, αy, γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= −
αx
zx
P (αx − 1, αy)
= −
αx
zx
P (αx − 1)P (αy)−
αx
zx
cov
[(
zx − x
zx
)αx−1
+
,
(
zy − y
zy
)αy
+
]
. (11)
P (αx − 1) in (11) is a multidimensional generalization of the unidimensional poverty im-
pact of targeting derived in Kanbur (1985). It also corresponds to the well-known result
that the sensitivity of unidimensional FGT poverty to changes in welfare is related to the
same FGT index, but with parameter set to α − 1. For multidimensional poverty, this ef-
fect must be multiplied by the level of unidimensional poverty in the other dimension —
the term P (αy) in (11) — although this other dimension is not targeted by the transfer.
The multidimensional poverty impact must also incorporate the covariance between the
poverty gaps in the dimensions x and y, to the powers αx − 1 and αy. As we will see
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later in the illustration, these additional effects can lead to different unidimensional and
multidimensional policy prescriptions.
For αx = 0, we have
P (0, αy) =
zx∫
0
zy∫
0
(
zy − y
zy
)αy
dF (x, y), (12)
This is the y poverty gap (to the power αy) of those that are poor both in the x and in the y
dimensions. The change in multidimensional poverty following an additive transfer is then
given by
∂P (αx, αy, γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= −P (αx = −1, αy). (13)
The targeting impact is thus proportional to the density of individuals around zx times the
unidimensional FGT index in dimension y, for those at x = zx. The targeting impact is
therefore quite different from the value of the index itself. It can also differ significantly
from the x headcount index in the x dimension. The per capita cost of a universal additive
transfer is R(γ) = γ, with ∂R(γ)/∂γ = 1. The change in aggregate poverty per additional
dollar spent per capita is thus also given by (11) and (13).
2.2.2 Multiplicative transfers
An alternative and commonly-modeled form of targeting increases a pre-transfer indi-
cator x by some proportion λ. (The poverty impact of inequality-neutral growth in x can
be similarly modeled.) Algebraically, post-transfer poverty can be written as
P (αx, αy, λ) =
∫ ∫ (
zx − x(1 + λ)
zx
)αx
+
(
zy − y
zy
)αy
+
dF (x, y). (14)
When αx > 0, the derivative of (14) with respect to λ is given by
∂P (αx, αy, λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= −αx[P (αx − 1, αy)− P (αx, αy)]. (15)
The per capita cost of such a multiplicative transfer is
R(λ) = λx, (16)
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where x is the average of x. The change in aggregate poverty per dollar spent per capita is
then:
∂P (αx, αy, λ)
∂λ
/
∂R(λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= −
αx
x
[P (αx − 1, αy)− P (αx, αy)]. (17)
The expression above is always negative since P (αx − 1, αy) > P (αx, αy) for αx >
0. (17) compares the value of two bidimensional indices. Poverty reduction following
a multiplicative transfer is faster the greater the difference between P (αx − 1, αy) and
P (αx, αy). Intuitively, this occurs when multiplicative transfers decrease the poverty gaps
of the “most important poor” fast — who are these normatively “most important poor”
depends on the value of the poverty aversion parameter αx. This requires the x values
of the poor to be not too close to 0 and the incomes x not to be too large either, again
depending on αx.
If αx = 0, the change in the bidimensional headcount per dollar spent is
∂P (αx, αy, λ)
∂λ
/
∂R(λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= −
zx
x
P (αx = −1, αy). (18)
Comparing (11) to (17), and (13) to (18), it is not possible to say a priori whether, for every
per capita dollar spent, an additive transfer reduces poverty faster than a multiplicative
transfer. For relatively poor societies — viz, where x is below the poverty line zx — a
multiplicative transfer will reduce poverty faster if αx = 0. For α > 0, the comparative
effects will also depend on the values of P (αx − 1, αy) and P (αx − 1, αy)− P (αx, αy).
2.3 Socio-economic targeting
In addition to taking various forms (such as additive and multiplicative ones), targeting
is rarely uniform across population groups. Socio-demographic characteristics are in par-
ticular often used to design targeting schemes, leading to “socio-economic targeting”. We
thus turn to how we may rank the poverty alleviation efficiency of such socio-economic
targeting schemes.
2.3.1 Additive transfers
Developing the framework above, we can provide insights as to which population sub-
group should be first targeted in order to reduce population poverty faster per dollar spent.
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For simplicity, assume that the total population is divided into two exclusive groups, A and
B (such as urban and rural areas, or regions/provinces in the empirical illustrations below).
Population poverty is then given by
P (αx, αy, γ
A, γB) = ωAPA(αx, αy, γ
A) + ωBPB(αx, αy, γ
B), (19)
where ωA and ωB are the population shares of groups A and B, γA and γB are additive
transfers targeted specifically to members of groups A and B, and PA and PB are poverty
levels for groups A and B, respectively.
To assess whether, for efficient population-level poverty reduction, an additive transfer
is better targeted towards group A or group B, we need to check whether
∂P (αx, αy, γ
A)
∂γA
/
∂R(γA, γB)
∂γA
⋚
∂P (αx, αy, γ
B)
∂γB
/
∂R(γA, γB)
∂γB
, (20)
where the per capita cost of an additive transfer is given by
R = ωAγA + ωBγB. (21)
We start with the case of αx > 0. We then have
∂P (αx, αy, γ
A)
∂γA
/
∂R
∂γA
∣∣∣∣
γA=γB=0
= −
αx
zx
PA(αx − 1, αy) (22)
and, similarly,
∂P (αx, αy, γ
B)
∂γB
/
∂R
∂γB
∣∣∣∣
γA=γB=0
= −
αx
zx
PB(αx − 1, αy). (23)
The largest aggregate poverty reduction per dollar spent per capita (namely, per pop-
ulation head) is then obtained by targeting that group that has the highest P (αx − 1, αy)
index. Looking back to (11), note that this will be the case for the group that displays the
highest P (αx − 1) index, the largest P (αy) index, and/or the highest covariance between
αx−1 and αy unidimensional gaps. It is clear that choosing the group to target on the basis
simply of the P (αx) indices will generally not lead to efficient multidimensional poverty
reduction strategies.
For αx = 0, αxzx P
A(αx−1, αy) and αxzx P
B(αx−1, αy) in (22) and (23) above are replaced
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respectively by PA(−1, αy) and PB(−1, αy). Again, the multidimensional poverty index
itself is not the right guide to selecting the better group to target. Instead, the efficient
targeting rule uses the y-dimension FGT index of those that are around the x poverty line,
multiplied by the density of the group’s individuals at the x-dimension poverty line.
2.3.2 Multiplicative transfers
Let us now identify efficient group selection rules under multiplicative targeting schemes.
The per capita cost of such a scheme is given by
R = ωAxA + ωBxB (24)
and, when αx > 0, changes in poverty due to a multiplicative transfer λ in groups A and B
respectively are given by
∂P (αx, αy, λ
A)
∂λA
/
∂R
∂λA
∣∣∣∣
λA=λB=0
= −
αx
xA
[PA(αx − 1, αy)− P
A(αx, αy)] (25)
and
∂P (αx, αy, λ
B)
∂λB
/
∂R
∂λB
∣∣∣∣
λA=λB=0
= −
αx
xB
[PB(αx − 1, αy)− P
B(αx, αy)]. (26)
For αx = 0, these expressions become
∂P (αx, αy, λ
A)
∂λA
/
∂R
∂λA
∣∣∣∣
λA=λB=0
= −
zx
xA
PA(αx = −1, αy) (27)
and
∂P (αx, αy, λ
B)
∂λB
/
∂R
∂λB
∣∣∣∣
λA=λB=0
= −
zx
xB
PB(αx = −1, αy). (28)
Again, the case in which the transfer is a proportion of dimension x is less straightfor-
ward to interpret than the case of an additive transfer. Looking back to (25) and (26), the
reduction in multidimensional poverty per dollar spent is the largest for those groups with
the lowest average income and the greatest distance between P (αx−1, αy) and P (αx, αy).
Those groups living in more deprived conditions in dimension x will have a lower x; the
difference in poverty of orders αx−1 and αx is also likely to be larger for those groups, but
not necessarily so. In addition, those groups are also likely to show higher poverty in other
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dimensions, but again not necessarily so; the assessment must further take into account the
correlation across dimensions (recall (9)).
For αx = 0, multidimensional population poverty falls fastest per dollar spent when
targeting favors those groups whose P (−1, αy) is largest and/or whose average income is
lowest, the explicit trade-off being shown in (27). A large P (−1, αy) value is observed
when the density around the x poverty line is large, and/or when those around that poverty
line have a large y poverty gap of order αy.
2.4 Targeting with dimensional spill-overs
Now suppose that dimension y is also indirectly affected by transfers γ made to dimen-
sion x. We suppose that this spill-over effect on y is captured by a function σ(y, γ), which
is equal to y in the absence of spill-over effects and thus with σ(y, 0) = y. We may re-write
(10) as
P (αx, αy, γ) =
∫ ∫ (
zx − x− γ
zx
)αx
+
(
zy − σ(y, γ)
zy
)αy
+
dF (x, y). (29)
For expositional purposes, let us think of x and y as income and health, respectively, two
dimensions in which welfare analysts are often jointly interested. (29) shows that a policy
that targets income explicitly (for instance, through a cash transfer) affects multidimen-
sional poverty directly through its impact on the poverty gap in dimension x, through its
multiplying effect on the gap in the other dimension y, and through its spill-over effect on
that other dimension, captured in (29) by σ(y, γ).
For αy > 0, the marginal spill-over effect on bidimensional poverty of a change in γ is
then given by
∂P (αx,αy ,γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
spill-over effect,γ=0 = −
αy
zy
P (αx)
∫ zy
0
∂σ(y,γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
(
zy−y
zy
)αy−1
dF (y) (30)
−αy
zy
cov
[(
zx−x
zx
)αx
+
, ∂σ(y,γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
(
zy−y
zy
)αy−1
+
]
,
and, for αy = 0, by
∂P (αx,αy,γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
spill-over effect,γ=0
= (31)
− ∂σ(y,γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
y=zy,γ=0
f(σ(y, γ) = zy)
∫ zx
0
(
zx−x
zx
)αx
dF (x| y = zy) .
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This spill-over effect adds to the other effects described above, either through the im-
pact of an additive or of a multiplicative transfer on dimension x. For instance, the net
multidimensional poverty effect of an additive transfer to dimension x would be the sum
of (11) (or (13) for αx = 0) and either (30) or (31). For a multiplicative transfer, expression
(11) is replaced by (15), and analogously for αx = 0.
The formulation of σ(y, γ) is sufficiently general to allow for several types of spill-
over effects on the second dimension. Special cases include additive spill-over effects,
when σ(y, γ) = y + γ, or multiplicative ones, when σ(y, γ) = (1 + γ)y. In all cases, the
spill-over effect is given by the mean of the product of the y poverty gaps to the power
α− 1 and the marginal change in σ(y, γ), weighted by the x poverty gaps to the power αx.
Importantly, whether this indirect effect favors targeting the more severely poor de-
pends on whether the severely poor’s welfare indicator y is more sensitive to γ. That may
or may not be the case. It also depends on whether the more severely poor in the x dimen-
sion are also poor in the y dimension, which again may or may not be the case.
These spill-over effects can then be normalized by the per capita cost of targeting di-
mension x. This is done in the same way as in Section 2.3. Doing so makes it possible
to assess which population subgroup should be targeted first in order to reduce multidi-
mensional poverty as quickly as possible, subject to resource constraints. If a per capita
targeting cost can also be assessed for each of the two dimensions, x and y, then such a
normalization further allows establishing which dimension (in addition to which group)
should preferably be targeted by public expenditures.
2.5 Targeting dominance
As in Section 2.1 for comparing poverty across two distributions, we might also want to
ensure that our targeting conclusions and policy recommendations are robust to the choice
of multidimensional poverty indices and to the choice of multidimensional poverty fron-
tiers. As in Section 2.1, we can do this for classes of indices denoted by Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗).
To test for whether a targeting preference for a group is robust to the choice of a multidi-
mensional poverty index within one such class of poverty indices, we can use “targeting
dominance surfaces”. These surfaces are given by expressions such as (13), (17), (22), (25)
and (30) (for spill-over effects) over areas of intersection poverty frontiers (zx, zy).
For instance, to rank robustly the impact of additive and proportional transfer policies
over the class Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗) of multidimensional poverty indices (with αx > 0), the tar-
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geting dominance surfaces given by (11) and (17) are compared over an area of intersection
poverty frontiers (zx, zy) lying within Λ(φ∗). Formally, assuming no spill-over effect:
Proposition 2
(Dominance of additive over multiplicative targeting)
For all P (φ) ∈ Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗) (with αx > 0) and for γ = λx, P (φ, γ) ≤ P (φ, λ) for
marginal γ and λ if and only if
−
αx
zx
P (αx − 1, αy) ≤ −
αx
x
[P (αx − 1, αy)− P (αx, αy)] ∀(zx, zy) ∈ Λ(φ
∗). (32)
This says that additive targeting will decrease poverty faster, per capita dollar spent,
than multiplicative targeting for all indices of poverty in Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗) if and only if ex-
pression (11) is always found to be lower than (17) regardless of the choice of intersection
poverty frontiers, as long as these frontiers lie within the maximum domain of poverty
frontiers within which a multidimensional poverty assessment can reasonably be made.
As above, the dominance tests compare additive and multiplicative impacts on multidi-
mensional intersection indices, although robustness is obtained over indices that include
intersection, union, and intermediate poverty indices.
Extensions of Proposition 2 can be made straightforwardly by allowing for spill-over
effects, by considering classes of order αx+1 = 1 in dimension x, or by assessing whether
robust socio-economic targeting conclusions can be obtained over classes of indices. An
example of dominance of additively targeting socio-economic group A over group B is
given by Proposition 3 (assuming no spill-over effect):
Proposition 3
(Dominance of additively targeting group A instead of group B)
For all P (φ) ∈ Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗) and for ωAγA = ωBγB , P (φ, γA) ≤ P (φ, γB) for
marginal γA and γB if and only if
−
αx
zx
PA(αx − 1, αy) ≤ −
αx
zx
PB(αx − 1, αy) ∀(zx, zy) ∈ Λ(φ
∗). (33)
Both Propositions 2 and 3 have the potential to generate robust targeting prescriptions.
It may however be that the targeting dominance surfaces happen to be not statistically dif-
ferent from each other over the entire area Λ(φ∗), or that they may even cross over that
area. In such cases, the normative and statistical validity of the targeting prescription will
depend on which subset of poverty indices within Παx+1,αy+1(φ∗) will be preferred. In
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such cases, inspection of the subareas of targeting dominance surfaces over which domi-
nance can be inferred can also serve to indicate the strength of the robustness of targeting
prescriptions.
3 Illustrations
3.1 Multiple deprivation and dimensional spill-over effects
As discussed above, the correlation — and more generally, the joint distribution — of
dimensions is important both for measurement and for policy purposes. From an empirical
perspective, much of this correlation usually reflects a “natural” distribution of dimensions.
An example is the correlation between child nutrition and schooling performance (and
adult labor outcomes): child malnutrition (especially if experienced during the first two
years of life) is usually associated with lower school and lifetime income (see, for example,
Glewwe and King 2001, Heckman 2008 and Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006 for
discussion and evidence).
Some of that joint distribution between dimensions of well-being can be driven (at least
partly) by policy. Policy can influence that joint distribution in a number of different ways.
Subsidized provision of education, health and housing may be one way to alleviate poverty
in each of its multiple dimensions and also jointly. Public investments in perinatal care
(for instance, through pre-natal health visits and nutritional programs for pregnant women)
can improve the health status of newborn children and their later life prospects in several
dimensions. Policy can thus serve to reduce both dimensional deprivation statuses and
their correlation, and thus also to reduce the prevalence of multiple deprivations.
The popularized conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs intend for instance to break
down the multidimensional (and inter-generational) poverty traps both by alleviating mon-
etary poverty and by increasing levels of human capital (health and education). A key
mechanism that is employed is the multidimensional conditionality of the transfers. The
cross-dimension effects of this have been most extensively demonstrated in the context
of Latin American countries. For example, Fiszbein and Schady (2009) show plenty of
cross-country evidence of CCT’s positive impacts on various health indicators and access
to health services, school enrolment and attendance, and — most prominently because of
the nature of the programs — on income poverty.
Note that the effect on health poverty of a cash transfer conditioned on family invest-
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ments in child health is likely to be higher than one without conditionality; the short-term
effect on monetary poverty may, however, be reduced by conditionality, if, for instance,
some of the transfers cannot then be used for short-term income production purposes.
Hence, conditionality may not be efficient for monetary poverty reduction, but may be
efficient for reducing multidimensional poverty, especially if substantial spill-over effects
exist.
The correlation across well-being attributes and the ability of policy to modify it also
depend on the quality of markets. Where markets are inexistant or highly imperfect, social
programs may be little effective at producing positive spill-over effects on dimensions
other than the targeted one. For example, in remote areas where appropriate schooling
infrastructure is missing or is of poor quality, social cash transfers for children may have
meagre effects on school outcomes (see for instance Kakwani, Soares, and Son 2006 and
Cockburn, Fofana, and Tiberti 2010).
All of this suggests points to the usefulness of a consistent multidimensional framework
for assessing the context-dependent impact of policy. It is not possible, of course, to take
empirically into account all of the possible effects of policy on multidimensional poverty.
It is nevertheless feasible and, we believe, useful to apply the analytical framework devel-
oped above to illustrate how these effects can feed into policy design and evaluation. We
do this in three different ways. We first assess the poverty impact and the efficiency of
simple targeting rules established on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics, following
the strong targeting tradition of the unidimensional poverty literature. We then enrich those
simple rules with a more realistic assessment of the impact of policies, policies that can
have spill-over effects beyond the dimensions that are targeted. We finally test the robust-
ness of targeting prescriptions using dominance results of the types shown in Propositions
2 and 3.
3.2 Data and estimation procedures
We apply the analytical approach presented above to two separate datasets from Viet-
nam and South Africa. These are the Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) 1992-1993
and the South Africa Integrated Household Survey (SAIHS) 1993. These two data sets
include information on household consumption and anthropometric measures, which is a
major reason for their use here. This information enables the construction of per capita
household consumption (deflated by appropriate spatial and temporal price deflators) and
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height-for-age z scores (HAZ), standardized by the growth standards found in WHO (2006).
These indicators of monetary welfare and of health are used for income poverty and health
poverty respectively. The analysis focuses on children under five years old. It is supposed
that policy can target consumption (dimension x in the above analytical framework), but
that the multidimensional poverty effectiveness of that policy depends on its impact on the
joint distribution of consumption and HAZ (dimension y).4
The spill-over effect on health of targeting consumption is obtained through the follow-
ing regression model:
yi = α + βxxi +
∑
k
βkzk,i + ǫi, (34)
where yi is the z-score for child i, xi is log per capita household consumption, βx is the co-
efficient associated to per capita consumption, zk is determinant k, βk is the associated co-
efficient, and ǫi is an error term. The model is borrowed from Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, and
Watanabe (2003), with OLS estimation and community-level fixed effects at the level of the
child’s commune. Note that the model is intended to provide a simple, reduced-form, rep-
resentation of potentially complex mechanisms linking consumption to children’s health.
These mechanisms will generally depend on household composition and intra-household
allocation rules, rules that are rarely observable for the analyst. An example is the dis-
tribution of cash transfers for the benefit of children. These can be directly distributed to
adults, with a potentially diluted effect on the targeted children. The transfers can alterna-
tively take the form of nutritional transfers, which could in principle be potentially better
targeted to children; with these transfers, there also exist, however, strategies that parents
can use in order to substitute away from children some of the additional resources intended
for them.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on HAZ and on the explanatory variables appear-
ing in the HAZ regressions. The estimated coefficients of the HAZ regression are shown
in Table 2. Most of the coefficients take the expected sign in all two surveys. Per capita
consumption is positively associated with child health; child health is negatively (and con-
vexly) linked to child age; in South Africa, being male is associated with worse health,
while having access to improved sanitation facilities improves health statistically only in
Vietnam 1992-93. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated parameters on access to safe water
sources and maternal schooling are not statistically significant.
4It is assumed that child consumption is increased by the value of the cash transfer. We thus abstract from
important intra-household allocation issues — also see below.
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The spill-over parameters of child consumption on child HAZ are produced by the es-
timates of Table 2 are 0.0171 percent for VLSS 1992-1993 and 0.1766 percent for SAIHS
1993. These parameters are obtained as ratios between ln(pc_consumption)’s coefficients
in Table 2 and the exponential of the mean of ln(pc_consumption). They are then cal-
culated as 0.2470/ exp(7.2705) for VLSS 1992-1993 and 0.2842/ exp(5.0808) for SAIHS
1993. These spill-over effects are used below in valuing the impact of a variation in child
consumption onto HAZ values for children.
3.3 Efficient multidimensional poverty targeting
We proceed by separating the total population into separate sub-population geograph-
ical groups — see their definition in Table 3. This makes it possible to interpret many of
the results below as guidance for geographical targeting and possibly for decentralization
of targeting funds. As suggested in WHO (2006), out-of-range values (<-5 and >3) for the
z-scores are dropped. For ease of exposition, a value of 10 is added to the HAZ variable
and to the poverty lines in the health dimension; such a transformation does not affect any
of the substantive results since we are interested in absolute multidimensional poverty, not
relative multidimensional poverty or inequality.
For benchmarking purposes, a reference annual monetary poverty line of 1790 thou-
sands Dong (in 1998 prices) is used for the Vietnamese survey, while a monthly monetary
poverty line of 164 Rand is used for South Africa. These values correspond to around 385
and 75 dollars (in 2005 ‘international’ dollars) respectively. For health, a poverty thresh-
old of -2 standard deviations is used for each of the two countries — this threshold is often
used to identify moderate-to-severe stunting (following the transformation of the HAZ vari-
able, the reference health poverty threshold is set to 8). These poverty lines are used for
reference purposes. For dominance, ranges of poverty lines are needed and these will be
discussed in section 3.4.
We focus on impacts on bidimensional poverty with αx = αy = 0 and αx = αy =
1, normalized by the per capita cost of the policy. The geographical units are ordered
according to the importance of the marginal poverty reduction that follows a marginal
increase in a consumption cash transfer.
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3.3.1 Vietnam 1992-1993
We start with Vietnam 1992, using αx = αy = 0 and the reference poverty lines
mentioned above. We first consider additive transfers. The results are shown in the upper
Panel A of Table 4, a panel that is split into four different sets of columns. The first column
of Table 4 shows the priority ranking that must be assigned to the groups shown in the
other columns. (All of the rankings shown are statistically significant at the conventional
5% level; the analytical procedures and the Stata routines for checking this are available
on request). The set of the next three columns then shows the unidimensional results,
namely, those results based only on the monetary impact of the transfer. The second set of
three columns multiplies this unidimensional impact by poverty in the second dimension.
The third set of three columns incorporates the impact of the monetary transfer on the
covariance of deprivation. The last set of three columns shows the total multidimensional
poverty impact of the transfer, adding to the earlier effects the spill-over effect on the non-
targeted dimension.
Focusing first on unidimensional poverty, a statistically significant larger reduction in
total poverty per dollar spent is obtained by targeting group 1 as opposed to groups 6, 5,
3 and 7. The second-best group to be targeted is group 2, whose unidimensional poverty
impact per dollar spent is significantly larger than 3 and 7. A statistical ranking cannot be
established with respect to any other geographical groups.
Let us now add the health poverty component. The effect of this is shown in the second
set of columns in Panel A of Table 4. A significant re-ranking across the geographical
groups is obtained. Groups 1 and 2 continue to be most efficiently prioritized but com-
parisons with other groups have changed: group 1 is now also preferred to groups 8 and
9 but not anymore to groups 3 and 6; as seen in Table 6, the reason is that groups 3 and 6
show the largest health headcount. Taking health poverty into account then moves groups
3 and 6 upward in terms of priority, but not enough to outrank groups 1 and 2. Targeting
group 2 is now statistically preferable to targeting groups 9, 8 and 5. The next groups to
be prioritized are groups 3, 10 and 6; targeting these groups provide a statistically larger
poverty reduction than targeting group 5.
For multidimensional poverty reduction, considering poverty in separate dimensions
is not enough; we must also take into account joint deprivation. This is done by adding
the covariance term to obtain the third set of columns in Table 4. A few changes in the
ranking of priority groups are immediately observable. Groups 1 and 2 are still the first
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priority groups; these groups are now statistically preferred to groups 5, 3, 8, 6, 4 and 7.
Targeting group 1 thus becomes statistically better than targeting groups 3, 6 or 4, but not
better anymore than targeting group 9. Similarly, group 2 is now also statistically preferred
to groups 3, 6, 4 and 7, but not anymore to group 9. Group 10 follows in the ranking and
is statistically preferred to group 7. Finally, group 9 is preferred to groups 6 and 7 since
health poverty for those around the consumption poverty line is larger for that group — see
equations (7) and (13).
The last set of columns shows the impact of adding spill-over effects, as indicated in
equation (31). Groups 1 and 2 then lose their statistical priority over group 8. Group 10
is now also preferred to group 6, while targeting group 5 allows for a statistically larger
reduction in multidimensional population poverty than targeting group 7.
Panel B of Table 4 shows priority rankings with αx = αy = 1; they also vary again
when moving away from unidimensional towards multidimensional poverty alleviation.
For instance, the rankings of groups 4, 6 and 7 depend on whether it is unidimensional
or multidimensional poverty that is alleviated. The same is true for many other priority
rankings for targeting.
As is well-known from the poverty literature, the use of different poverty indices can
affect quantitatively and qualitatively the nature of poverty comparisons. As is less well
known, that can also affect the comparative evaluation of targeting schemes. This can
be observed by comparing Panels A and B in Table 4. In particular, looking at the last
set of columns (Total impact with spill-over), targeting groups 3 and 7 is a statistically
significant priority with αx = αy = 1 (the multidimensional poverty gap) but clearly not
with αx = αy = 0 (the multidimensional headcount). Conversely, there is no reason to
prefer group 9 with the multidimensional poverty gap, while a priority for group 9 over
groups 6 and 7 can be statistically inferred with the multidimensional headcount.
More generally speaking, the use of multidimensional poverty gaps yields more precise
targeting guidance than the use of multidimensional headcounts. Greater statistical preci-
sion emerges because greater sample information is used with the poverty gap than with the
headcount: when it comes to estimating standard errors, all observations below the poverty
lines are important, not only those close to those lines. Greater normative strength is also
obtained with the multidimensional poverty gap: the priority ranking with the multidimen-
sional poverty gap is established by looking at the average welfare impact across all of the
poor, and not only by considering whether that impact is large enough to lift some of the
poor out of multidimensional poverty.
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The results following a proportional transfer are shown in Table 5. The priority rank-
ings differ significantly relative to those of additive transfers in Table 4. With αx = αy = 0,
for instance, proportional transfers to group 1 are preferred to proportional transfers to
groups 2, 8 and 9, which is not the case for additive transfers. The transfer schemes are
thus important in establishing social-economic targeting priorities. These Vietnamese re-
sults are driven by the large average consumption of groups 2, 8 and 9 (see Table 6). As
seen in equation (18), a x larger than zx (as in the case of groups 2, 8 and 9) makes propor-
tional targeting less efficient.
3.3.2 South Africa
Let us now turn to regional targeting in South Africa. The main results for additive
targeting are shown in Table 7. Let us focus on αx = αy = 1 (Panel B) and on some of
the more interesting findings. Take group 5, for instance; it has a relatively large health
headcount (see Table 8) as well as a large average health poverty gap, but its level of
consumption poverty is relatively low. Hence, with unidimensional poverty, a statistically
significant preference for targeting groups 3, 9, 13, and 6 over group 5 can be established;
with multidimensional poverty, this is not the case anymore. Conversely, targeting group 9
(which has high consumption poverty) is better than targeting any of groups 11, 2, 5, 16, 8
or 1 for unidimensional poverty reduction but this is nevertheless not the case anymore for
multidimensional poverty.
Moving from αx = αy = 0 to αx = αy = 1 again changes policy guidance dra-
matically. This is easily seen by comparing panels A and B of Table 7. As an example,
group 3 is dominated by most other geographical groups when αx = αy = 0, while, with
αx = αy = 1, it dominates 16 out of 17 possible groups (group 5 is the only group not
statistically outranked by group 3). While group 3 shows an extraordinarily large con-
sumption headcount and health poverty gap (which explains its high priority ranking under
α = 1: Figure 1, Panel A), nearly nobody lies around the consumption poverty line (which
explains the small bidimensional impact when α = 0, see Panel B of Figure 1). This impor-
tant distinction between the incidence and the intensity of multidimensional poverty, and
between levels of multidimensional poverty and efficient strategies for multidimensional
poverty alleviation, explains the important reversals of priority rankings when moving from
αx = αy = 0 to αx = αy = 1.
22
3.4 Targeting dominance
The results above show how a switch from unidimensional to multidimensional poverty
can change the nature of efficient poverty reduction strategies. They also show that priority
rankings can sometimes depend on how multidimensional poverty is measured. We now
use the methods of Section 2.5 to construct multidimensional targeting dominance surfaces
and thus assess whether priority rankings for group targeting are robust over classes of
multidimensional poverty indices.
Recall that distribution A dominates distribution B if that A’s dominance surface is
lower than that of B over a sufficiently large area of poverty frontiers. In terms of targeting
dominance, the same applies but through comparing the targeting dominance surfaces of
groups A and B, as in Proposition 3. Prioritizing a group with a more negative targeting
surface will lead to a faster reduction in multidimensional poverty per dollar spent.
For practical purposes, ten equally-spaced different poverty lines (equal to or lower
than the reference poverty lines) are used for each of the two dimensions, yielding 100
possible combinations of poverty line.5 We specify 10 different poverty lines for each of
the two dimensions, giving an area of poverty frontiers set over 100 possible combinations
of consumption and health poverty lines. The 10 poverty lines in each dimension are set at
the minimum values of the indicators plus the deciles of the distance between the official
poverty lines and those minimum values. The upper limit of those lines (the upper right
corners in the forthcoming figures) corresponds to the official poverty lines, while the lower
poverty lines are at the lower left corners. The dominance results are shown in Figures 2, 3,
4 and 5; they show the p-values of differences in poverty impact across alternative targeting
strategies.
For Vietnam 1992-1993 and for the Π1,1 class of indices, Figure 2a shows that targeting
group 2 should be prioritized relative to group 5 as this would allow a larger reduction in
multidimensional poverty over most of the bidimensional poverty domain. Move now
to 1993 South Africa. Figure 2b says that group 15 should be preferred to group 16:
the reduction in total multidimensional poverty that follows from targeting group 15 is
statistically always greater (at a 5% level) over the entire area of poverty frontiers shown in
that Figure. Given the results of Propositions 2 and 3, this says that a priority for group 15
over group 16 in South Africa can be established on the basis of the entire class Π1,1(φ∗) of
multidimensional poverty indices, for all the poverty areas that fit within the Λ(φ∗) shown
5The findings are robust to choosing a larger number of lines.
23
in the Figure.
Let us now move to the class of bidimensional poverty indices Π2,2(φ∗). Figure 3 shows
that targeting group 3 is preferable to targeting group 8 over the whole area of poverty
frontiers shown in that figure. This says that the reduction in the multidimensional poverty
gap is faster when group 3 is targeted. It also says that all of the multidimensional poverty
indices that are members of the Π2,2(φ∗) class will fall faster if group 3 is targeted instead
of group 8. Relative to group 2, targeting group 3 is statistically dominant only over upper
health and consumption poverty lines. Group 3 dominates group 4 for intermediate areas
of poverty lines.
Consider now Figure 4 for South Africa. Panel B of Table 7 showed that it was better to
target group 3 instead of groups 13 and 14 for efficient multidimensional poverty gap (αx =
αy = 1) reduction at the reference poverty lines. Figure 4 shows that this is not necessarily
true for all poverty frontiers and for all indices in the Π2,2(φ∗) class. Targeting group
3 dominates targeting group 13 only over the area of consumption poverty lines above
around 70 Rand and health poverty lines above around 7.5. A more detailed examination
of the results shows that while the product of consumption and health poverty (the first
term on the right-hand side of (11)) does allow a robust ranking even for lower poverty
lines, this is not anymore the case when the joint deprivation effect (the second term on the
right-hand side of (11)) is added in. Targeting group 3 is, however, preferable to targeting
14 over the the entire range of poverty lines shown in Figure 4, thus indicating targeting
dominance of group 3 over group 14.
Figure 5 for 1993 South Africa shows a case in which taking into account multidi-
mensional deprivation helps sharpen targeting prescriptions. Figure 5a shows the usual
p-values of the differences in the targeting dominance surfaces of two groups, in that case
groups 13 and 9, for additive transfers and over the class Π2,2(φ∗) of indices. Figure 5b
shows p-values of the differences in the consumption and in the health unidimensional
targeting dominance curves. Although, for most poverty lines, neither univariate target-
ing dominance is statistically observed (with the exception of health poverty lines lower
than about 7.3, which are quite low), for a large area of multidimensional combinations
of these poverty lines the poverty reduction through targeting group 13 dominates statisti-
cally that from targeting group 9. The fundamental reason for this is lower health poverty
in group 9 than in group 13 (0.024 versus 0.039 — see Table 8 — as estimated at the ref-
erence poverty line), lower deprivation in group 9 than 13 (0.002 versus 0.004) as well as
a smaller spill-over effect in group 9.
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4 Conclusion
The paper derives targeting rules, both theoretically and empirically, that can reduce
poverty as quickly as possible per overall per capita dollar spent. Simple transfer schemes
are considered, such as additive and multiplicative transfers, but generalizations of these
as well as transfers that have spill-over effects on other dimensions can also be analyzed.
Those targeting rules can help identify which socioeconomic groups (such as provinces
or regions, smaller or larger families, wage workers or farmers) should be prioritized for
efficient poverty reduction. It is also shown how targeting dominance techniques can help
check the normative robustness of targeting rules. Applications of this framework to the
alleviation of child poverty in Vietnam and South Africa show how these tools can help
monitor and maximize the reduction in multidimensional consumption and health poverty.
An important and intuitively reasonable message that runs across the paper is that the
nature of efficient targeting rules may depend on whether it is unidimensional or multidi-
mensional poverty that policy is intended to reduce. In contrast to unidimensional poverty
— where it is only the impact on a single dimension that matters —, the paper emphasizes
three possible effects of targeting on multidimensional poverty, denoted as a direct effect
on the targeted dimension, an indirect effect on joint deprivation and a possible spill-over
effect on the other dimensions. Because of this, some targeting schemes may end up being
more efficient at reducing univariate poverty but less so at alleviating multidimensional
poverty, and vice versa. The value of targeting prescriptions also depends on the structure
of the transfers; whether a group should be prioritized may depend, for instance, on the
nature of the transfers that are being contemplated (such as whether the transfers will be
additive or multiplicative).
The paper further points out that the appropriate indicators to use to design efficient
targeting schemes are not the poverty indices themselves. For multiplicative transfers, for
instance, it is the level of average welfare plus the distance between two multidimensional
indices that should be used to identify which group it is most efficient to target. This makes
it necessary inter alia to consider non-obvious but important trade-offs between the effect
of targeting on the poorest of the poor and the effect of targeting on the speed of income
increase among the not-so-poor.
The social value of targeting schemes also depends on the choice of poverty mea-
sures that policy is intended to reduce. The arbitrariness involved in choosing one specific
poverty index and one specific poverty frontier and the possible sensitivity of targeting pre-
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scriptions to that choice make it desirable to use targeting dominance tools. These tools are
developed and applied in the paper; apart from being linked to simple intersection poverty
indices, they can also help assess the normative strength of targeting prescriptions.
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Appendix A Tables
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of vari-
ables included in the HAZ regressions
VLSS92-93 SAIHS93
HAZ -2.20 -1.22
(1.35) (1.47)
ln(pc_consumption) 7.27 5.08
(0.52) (0.92)
age_months 32.02 31.32
(17.43) (16.71)
age_months2 1328.86 1260.27
(1118.27) (1063.74)
gender 0.50 0.50
(0.50) (0.50)
safe_water 0.79 0.83
(0.41) (0.37)
safe_sanitation 0.14 0.35
(0.35) (0.48)
schooling_mother 6.51 5.56
(3.44) (3.61)
# of observations 2754 3858
Note: standard deviations are reported in parenthe-
ses. Means and standard deviations are estimated on
the sample of children 0-5 years old retained for the
regression analysis.
Source: authors’ analysis based on VLSS 1992-1993
and SAIHS 1993.
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Table 2: HAZ regressions’ coefficients
explanatory variables VLSS92-93 SAIHS93
ln(pc_consumption) 0.2470 0.2842
(3.61) (6.47)
age_months -0.0764 -0.0567
(-12.55) (-9.8)
age_months2 0.0010 0.0008
(10.88) (8.53)
gender 0.0262 -0.1232
(0.54) (-2.71)
safe_water 0.0543 -0.1752
(0.5) (-1.72)
safe_sanitation 0.2405 0.1404
(2.68) (0.95)
schooling_mother 0.0167 0.0135
(1.61) (1.74)
constant -3.0117 -1.7532
(-6.27) (-7.14)
Adj. R2 0.1551 0.1696
# of observations 2754 3858
Note: t-stats are reported in parentheses. Explanatory
variables are not necessarily comparable across surveys
since their definition may differ.
Source: authors’ analysis based on VLSS 1992-1993 and
SAIHS 1993.
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Table 3: Numbering of the geographical groups, VLSS92-93 and SAIHS93
(a) VLSS92-93 area
urban rural
re
gi
o
n
RedRiverDelta 8 6
Northeast 3 3
Northwest 4 4
NorthCentralCoast 7 7
SouthCentralCoast 5 10
CentralHighlands 1 1
Southeast 5 2
MekongRiverDelta 9 2
(c) SAIHS93 area
metro urban rural
pr
o
v
in
ce
Western Cape 1 1 1
Northern Cape 2 2
Eastern Cape 3 4 5
KwaZulu-Natal 6 7 8
Free State 9 10
Mpumalanga 11 12
Limpopo 13 14
North West 15 16
Gauteng 17 17 18
Note: The geographical groups appearing in the tables were obtained as a combination of regions/provinces
and areas. E.g., group “1” in VLSS92-93 corresponds to the combination of urban and rural areas in the
Central Highlands region.
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Table 4: Impact of additively targeting consumption on bidimensional poverty: Vietnam 1992-1993 (x 10−4)
Ranking Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Panel A: αx = αy = 0
Unidimensional Product of two dimensions Multidimensional Total impact with spill-over
−P (αx = −1) −P (αx = −1)P (αy) −[P (αx = −1)P (αy) + cov(.)]
1 1 -5.98 6:5:3:7 1 -3.59 7:9:8:5 1 -3.58 5:3:8:6:4:7 1 -3.76 5:3:6:7:4
2 2 -4.52 3:7 2 -2.49 9:8:5 2 -2.52 5:3:8:6:4:7 2 -2.70 5:3:6:7:4
3 10 -3.89 3 -2.27 5 10 -2.04 7 9 -2.28 6:7
4 9 -3.54 10 -2.22 5 9 -1.95 6:7 10 -2.22 6:7
5 4 -3.48 6 -2.21 5 5 -1.53 8 -2.00
6 6 -3.27 4 -2.16 3 -1.32 5 -1.84 7
7 5 -3.24 7 -1.94 8 -1.26 3 -1.36
8 3 -3.20 9 -1.59 6 -1.05 6 -1.16
9 8 -3.14 8 -1.35 4 -1.03 7 -1.08
10 7 -2.83 5 -1.28 7 -1.00 4 -1.06
Panel B: αx = αy = 1
−(αx/zx)[P (αx − 1)] −(αx/zx)[P (αx − 1)P (αy)] −(αx/zx)[P (αx − 1)P (αy) + cov(.)] Total impact with spill-over
1 4 -5.20 7:6:10:1:2:9:5:8 3 -0.50 6:4:10:2:9:5:8 3 -0.52 6:4:10:2:5:9:8 3 -0.57 6:4:10:2:5:9:8
2 3 -4.99 6:10:1:2:9:5:8 7 -0.48 6:4:10:2:9:5:8 7 -0.50 6:4:10:2:5:9:8 7 -0.55 6:4:10:2:5:9:8
3 7 -4.81 10:1:2:9:5:8 6 -0.39 10:2:9:5:8 1 -0.43 2:5:9:8 1 -0.47 5:9:8
4 6 -4.63 10:2:9:5:8 1 -0.37 9:5:8 6 -0.40 2:5:9:8 6 -0.44 2:5:9:8
5 10 -3.94 9:5:8 4 -0.37 2:9:5:8 4 -0.37 5:9:8 4 -0.41 5:9:8
6 1 -3.88 9:5:8 10 -0.29 9:5:8 10 -0.33 5:9:8 10 -0.36 5:9:8
7 2 -3.74 9:5:8 2 -0.27 9:5:8 2 -0.29 5:9:8 2 -0.32 5:9:8
8 9 -2.26 9 -0.09 8 5 -0.11 8 5 -0.12 8
9 5 -1.70 5 -0.07 9 -0.07 9 -0.08
10 8 -1.16 8 -0.04 8 -0.04 8 -0.04
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the VLSS 1992-1993.
Note: The “groups dominated” (in italics) are those groups for which the difference in poverty impact is significant at 5 percent.
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Table 5: Impact of proportionately targeting consumption on bidimensional poverty: Vietnam 1992-1993 (x 10−6)
Ranking Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Panel A: αx = αy = 0
Unidimensional Product of two dimensions Multidimensional Total impact with spill-over
−(zx/x)P (αx = −1) −(zx/x)P (αx = −1)P (αy) −(zx/x)[P (αx = −1)P (αy) + cov(.)]
1 1 -6.8 6:7:9:5:8 1 -4.1 2:9:5:8 1 -4.1 2:3:4:6:7:9:5:8 1 -4.1 2:3:4:6:7:9:5:8
2 4 -5.2 5:8 3 -3.2 9:5:8 2 -2.5 6:7:9:5:8 2 -2.5 6:7:9:5:8
3 3 -4.5 9:5:8 4 -3.2 9:5:8 10 -2.4 5:8 10 -2.4 5:8
4 10 -4.5 9:5:8 6 -2.9 9:5:8 3 -1.9 8 3 -1.9 8
5 2 -4.4 9:5:8 7 -2.6 9:5:8 4 -1.5 4 -1.5
6 6 -4.2 9:5:8 10 -2.6 9:5:8 6 -1.4 6 -1.4
7 7 -3.8 5:8 2 -2.4 9:5:8 7 -1.3 7 -1.3
8 9 -2.3 9 -1.1 9 -1.3 9 -1.3
9 5 -2.0 5 -0.8 5 -0.9 5 -0.9
10 8 -1.7 8 -0.7 8 -0.7 8 -0.7
Panel B: αx = αy = 1
−(αx/x)[P (αx − 1)− P (αx)] −(αx/x)[(P (αx − 1) − P (αx))P (αy)] −(αx/x)[(P (αx − 1)− P (αx))P (αy) + cov(.)] Total impact with spill-over
1 4 -4.9 7:6:10:1:2:9:5:8 3 -0.5 4:6:1:10:2:9:5:8 3 -0.5 4:6:1:10:2:5:9:8 3 -0.5 4:6:1:10:2:9:8
2 3 -4.5 6:10:1:2:9:5:8 7 -0.4 6:1:10:2:9:5:8 7 -0.4 6:1:10:2:5:9:8 7 -0.5 6:1:10:2:9:8
3 7 -4.2 10:1:2:9:5:8 4 -0.4 10:2:9:5:8 4 -0.4 10:2:5:9:8 4 -0.4 10:2:9:8
4 6 -4.0 10:1:2:9:5:8 6 -0.3 10:2:9:5:8 6 -0.3 10:2:5:9:8 6 -0.4 10:2:9:8
5 10 -2.9 9:5:8 1 -0.3 9:5:8 1 -0.3 5:9:8 1 -0.3 9:8
6 1 -2.8 9:5:8 10 -0.2 9:5:8 10 -0.2 5:9:8 10 -0.3 9:8
7 2 -2.5 9:5:8 2 -0.2 9:5:8 2 -0.2 5:9:8 2 -0.2 9:8
8 9 -1.1 9 -0.0 5 -0.1 5 -0.1
9 5 -0.8 5 -0.0 9 -0.0 9 -0.0
10 8 -0.5 8 -0.0 8 -0.0 8 -0.0
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the VLSS 1992-1993.
Note: The “groups dominated” (in italics) are those groups for which the difference in poverty impact is significant at 5 percent.
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Table 6: Population shares and poverty gaps in consumption and health di-
mensions: Vietnam 1992-1993
Groups Population
shares
Consumption Health
P0 P1 mean P0 P1 mean
1 0.034 0.695 0.249 1565.785 0.600 0.096 7.617
2 0.260 0.669 0.211 1834.894 0.551 0.073 7.958
3 0.160 0.893 0.321 1262.547 0.710 0.100 7.459
4 0.036 0.930 0.336 1209.299 0.620 0.071 7.711
5 0.070 0.304 0.077 2936.803 0.397 0.041 8.414
6 0.172 0.829 0.277 1387.726 0.678 0.083 7.698
7 0.145 0.862 0.307 1329.38 0.686 0.101 7.521
8 0.021 0.207 0.031 3348.073 0.431 0.031 8.239
9 0.032 0.404 0.119 2699.172 0.449 0.038 8.431
10 0.068 0.706 0.261 1552.488 0.572 0.074 7.884
Population 1 0.729 0.247 1679.308 0.607 0.080 7.798
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the VLSS 1992-1993.
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Table 7: Impact of additively targeting consumption on bidimensional poverty: South Africa 1993 (x 10−3)
Ranking Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups
dominated
Group Population
poverty
change
Groups domi-
nated
Panel A: αx = αy = 0
Unidimensional Product of two dimensions Multidimensional Total impact with spill-over
−P (αx = −1) −P (αx = −1)P (αy) −[P (αx = −1)P (αy) + cov(.)]
1 4 -4.58 18:3 17 -1.33 2:12:16:1:3:14:18:7 4 -3.07 3 4 -3.15 3
2 6 -3.85 12:1:7:2:16:18:3 5 -1.25 18:7 15 -2.95 13:1:17:18:16:2:3 15 -3.08 13:1:17:18:16:2:3
3 8 -3.83 1:2:18:3 6 -1.25 2:12:16:1:3:14:18:7 6 -2.53 1:17:18:16:2:3 6 -2.68 1:17:18:16:2:3
4 15 -3.65 1:7:2:16:18:3 4 -1.19 9 -2.21 9 -2.33
5 5 -3.48 1:2:18:3 8 -1.09 7 8 -2.21 18:3 8 -2.31 3
6 17 -3.23 18:3 15 -1.05 12:1:3:14:18:7 10 -2.08 3 12 -2.26 3
7 10 -3.19 18:3 13 -1.00 2:12:1:3:14:18:7 11 -2.07 18:3 10 -2.25 3
8 11 -3.04 18:3 10 -0.98 12:1:3:14:18:7 5 -2.01 3 11 -2.24 3
9 13 -2.88 18:3 11 -0.85 1:3:18:7 12 -2.00 3 5 -2.15 3
10 9 -2.59 9 -0.73 13 -1.93 3 14 -2.10 3
11 12 -2.58 3 2 -0.67 18:7 14 -1.93 13 -2.03 3
12 14 -2.35 12 -0.50 7 -1.84 3 7 -2.03 3
13 1 -2.25 3 16 -0.50 1 -1.54 3 1 -1.79 3
14 7 -2.15 1 -0.47 17 -1.43 3 17 -1.78 3
15 2 -1.89 3 -0.45 18 -1.35 3 18 -1.59 3
Panel B: αx = αy = 1
−(αx/zx)[P (αx − 1)] −(αx/zx)[P (αx − 1)P (αy)] −(αx/zx)[P (αx − 1)P (αy) + cov(.)] Total impact with spill-over
1 3 -5.44 13:6:15:11:4:10:2:5: 3 -0.26 13:6:4:2:15:10: 3 -0.27 13:6:10:15:4:8: 3 -0.31 13:6:10:15:9:4:
12:16:17:14:8:7:1:18 9:11:8:17:16:12: 2:9:11:16:12:17: 8:2:11:16:12:17:
1:18:7:14 18:14:1:7 14:18:1:7
2 9 -4.78 11:2:5:12:16:17:14:8: 13 -0.18 9:11:8:17:16:12: 13 -0.20 9:11:12:17:18:14: 13 -0.24 9:2:11:12:17:14:
7:1:18 1:18:7:14 1:7 7
3 13 -4.60 6:15:11:2:5:12:16: 6 -0.16 11:8:17:16:12:1: 5 -0.20 5 -0.22
17:14:8:7:1:18 18:7:14
4 6 -3.96 5:12:16:17:14:8: 5 -0.13 6 -0.17 12:17:18:14:1:7 6 -0.18 12:17:14:18:1:7
7:1:18
5 15 -3.84 12:16:17:14:8:7:1:18 4 -0.13 12:1:18:7:14 10 -0.16 12:17:18:14:1:7 10 -0.18 12:17:14:18:1:7
6 11 -3.71 12:17:14:8:7:1:18 2 -0.12 12:1:18:7:14 15 -0.15 12:17:18:14:1:7 15 -0.18 12:17:14:18:1:7
7 4 -3.61 12:17:14:8:7:1:18 15 -0.12 12:1:18:7:14 4 -0.14 17:18:14:1:7 9 -0.16 12:17:14:18:1:7
8 10 -3.60 12:17:14:8:7:1:18 10 -0.12 12:1:18:7:14 8 -0.14 7 4 -0.15 14:18:1:7
9 2 -3.14 17:8:7:1:18 9 -0.11 12:1:18:7:14 2 -0.13 18:14:1:7 8 -0.15 18:1:14
10 5 -2.33 11 -0.10 12:1:18:7:14 9 -0.13 17:18:14:1:7 2 -0.15 18:1:14
11 12 -2.03 18 8 -0.08 11 -0.12 17:18:14:1:7 11 -0.14 17:14:18:1:7
12 16 -1.94 17 -0.07 18:7:14 16 -0.10 16 -0.11
13 17 -1.79 16 -0.05 12 -0.07 7 12 -0.08 7
14 14 -1.74 12 -0.04 17 -0.06 7 17 -0.08 7
15 8 -1.67 1 -0.03 18 -0.05 7 14 -0.06
16 7 -1.65 18 -0.02 14 -0.05 18 -0.05 7
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the SAIHS 1993.
Notes: The “groups dominated” (in italics) are those groups for which the difference in poverty impact is significant at 5 percent;
Lower ranked groups that do not dominate any group are not reported in the table for lack of space.
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Table 8: Population shares and poverty gaps in the consumption and health
dimensions: South Africa 1993
Groups Population
shares
Consumption Health
P0 P1 mean P0 P1 mean
1 0.068 0.251 0.078 473.337 0.210 0.021 9.109
2 0.013 0.515 0.207 194.412 0.356 0.040 8.356
3 0.146 0.894 0.473 107.529 0.384 0.048 8.474
4 0.016 0.593 0.209 256.718 0.261 0.036 8.993
5 0.015 0.383 0.125 226.900 0.361 0.057 8.404
6 0.140 0.649 0.232 158.029 0.324 0.041 8.646
7 0.038 0.271 0.085 365.650 0.115 0.014 9.211
8 0.022 0.274 0.097 294.640 0.286 0.046 8.903
9 0.024 0.785 0.399 130.403 0.284 0.024 8.901
10 0.034 0.591 0.250 238.046 0.306 0.033 8.740
11 0.063 0.610 0.252 189.990 0.279 0.028 8.772
12 0.025 0.333 0.096 402.422 0.196 0.018 8.781
13 0.151 0.755 0.355 138.297 0.346 0.039 8.517
14 0.011 0.285 0.118 376.269 0.171 0.012 9.221
15 0.057 0.631 0.274 199.732 0.287 0.031 8.727
16 0.012 0.318 0.125 354.744 0.273 0.026 9.359
17 0.029 0.294 0.123 252.045 0.412 0.038 8.375
18 0.137 0.196 0.063 600.252 0.193 0.021 9.301
National 1 0.554 0.241 263.750 0.292 0.034 8.781
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the SAIHS 1993.
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Appendix B Figures
Figure 1: Consumption density and FGT indices for South Africa’s group 3
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Source: authors’ analysis based on data from SAIHS 1993.
Figure 2: Testing targeting dominance for the class of Π1,1 indices (additive transfers)
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(b) South Africa 1993
Note: the first graph shows the p-values of the differences in poverty impact between targeting group 2
and targeting group 5 in Vietnam; the second graph shows the p-values of the differences in poverty impact
between targeting group 15 and targeting group 16 in South Africa. Lighter areas indicate where it is statis-
tically more likely that targeting the first group (in each of the two graphs) will reduce poverty faster.
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the VLSS 1992-1993 and SAIHS 1993.
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Figure 3: Testing targeting dominance of group 3 over other groups for the class of Π2,2
indices, Vietnam 1992-1993 (additive transfers)
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Note: the graphs show the p-values of the differences in poverty impact between targeting group 3 and
targeting other groups; the lighter areas indicate where it is statistically more likely that targeting group 3
will reduce poverty faster.
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the VLSS 1992-1993.
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Figure 4: Testing targeting dominance of group 3 over other groups for the class of Π2,2
indices (additive transfers), South Africa 1993
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Note: the graphs show the p-values of the differences in poverty impact between targeting group 3 and
targeting other groups; the lighter areas indicate where it is statistically more likely that targeting group 3
will reduce poverty faster.
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the SAIHS 1993.
Figure 5: Testing the dominance of targeting group 13 over group 9 for the class of Π2,2
indices (additive transfers)
6.
5
7
7.
5
8
H
AZ
50 70 90 110 130 150 170
Per capita expenditure
0
.01
.05
.1
p−
va
lu
e
(a) multidimensional
.
01.
05
.
1
p−
va
lu
e
50 100 150 200
Per capita expenditure
p−value of the difference
.
01
.
05
.
1p−
va
lu
e
6.5 7 7.5 8
HAZ
p−value of the difference
(b) unidimensional
Note: the first graph shows the p-values of the differences in poverty impact between targeting group 13
and targeting group 9; the lighter areas indicate where it is statistically more likely that targeting group 13
will reduce poverty faster. The second graph shows the p-values of the difference in the unidimensional
poverty impact between targeting group 13 and targeting group 9, in the dimension of consumption and
health poverty, respectively.
Source: authors’ analysis based on data from the SAIHS 1993.
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